This article investigates how a firm's financial strength affects its dynamic decision to invest in R&D. We estimate a dynamic model of R&D choice using data for German firms in high-tech manufacturing industries. The model incorporates a measure of the firm's financial strength, derived from its credit rating, which is shown to lead to substantial differences in estimates of the costs and expected longrun benefits from R&D investment. Financially strong firms have a higher probability of generating innovations from their R&D investment, and the innovations have a larger impact on productivity and profits. Averaging across all firms, the long run benefit of investing in R&D equals 6.6 percent of firm value. It ranges from 11.6 percent for firms in a strong financial position to 2.3 percent for firms in a weaker financial position.
Introduction
The paper by Crépon, Duguet, and Mairesse (1998) (hereafter, CDM) provides an organizing framework linking …rm data on research, innovation, and productivity. In the past 15 years it has become the basis for a large empirical literature analyzing the relationship between R&D investment, innovation outcomes such as new product introductions and patents, and productivity. The empirical studies built on this framework have established that …rm R&D We are grateful to Eric Bartelsman, Bronwyn Hall, Jordi Jaumandreu, Hans Lööf, Florin Maican, Jacques Mairesse, Pierre Mohnen, Matilda Orth, and Hongsong Zhang for helpful comments and discussions. We thank the Center for European Economic Research (ZEW) for providing data access and research support. Contact information: Peters (b.peters@zew.de), Roberts (mroberts@psu.edu), Vuong (vananh.vuong@ewi.uni-koeln.de) 1 investment increases innovation outputs and these in turn are positively correlated with …rm productivity. Firm productivity growth is not an exogenous nor purely random process but is rather systematically a¤ected by the …rm's R&D investment decision.
The process of a …rm's endogenous investment in R&D is characterized by costs that are largely sunk, up-front expenditures and a payo¤ that is both uncertain and delayed in time.
A recent paper by Peters, Roberts, Vuong, and Fryges (2013) (hereafter, PRVF) develops a dynamic, structural model of the …rm's R&D investment decision that explicitly incorporates these characteristics and also the research-innovation-productivity linkage identi…ed in the CDM literature. 1 In PRVF, the …rm's demand for R&D depends on its current cost and the expected payo¤ to the investment, where the latter depends on how R&D a¤ects innovation outcomes, how these outcomes a¤ect the …rm's future productivity and pro…ts, and how long-lived these e¤ects are. Their analysis provides estimates of the expected bene…ts of R&D, that are de…ned as the increment to long-run …rm value resulting from the R&D investment.
The PRVF model assumes that …rms will choose to invest in R&D whenever the expected discounted stream of bene…ts is greater than the incurred cost. One further factor that can play a crucial role in the …rm's investment decision is its …nancial resources. This a¤ects the ability to …nance the R&D outlays and to successfully develop and market the innovations.
Financing of R&D can be done with a combination of current cash ‡ow, retained past earnings, and borrowing. Firms that are in poor …nancial condition are not likely to have access to these resources and may thus be constrained in their R&D decision. In this article we extend the PRVF model to recognize that …rms di¤er in their ability to …nance R&D investment.
We construct a summary measure of a …rm's …nancial strength, based on their credit rating, re ‡ecting their ability to fund R&D investments. This measure depends on, among other things, information on the …rm's sales, capital stocks, order history, growth, and history of bill payments.
The model is estimated using …rm-level data for …ve high-tech industries in the German manufacturing sector. The results indicate signi…cant di¤erences in both the cost and the longrun expected bene…ts of R&D across …rms with di¤erent levels of …nancial strength. Firms 1 Roberts and Vuong (2013) provide a nontechnical overview of the PRVF framework. 2 in the highest …nancial strength category have the largest productivity improvements following an innovation. A …rm in the highest …nancial strength category that reports a new product innovation has a productivity increase of 8.6 percent on average, while a new process innovation leads to a 9.0 percent increase, and both types of innovations lead to an increase of 11.5 percent.
In contrast, …rms in the lowest credit-rating category have productivity increases of 0.8, 0.6, and 3.8 percent, respectively. Firms with higher credit ratings also have a higher probability of realizing a product or process innovation. Both of these factors lead to higher expected bene…ts from R&D investment for …rms with better credit ratings. Expecting a high level of bene…ts, …rms will be willing to spend more on R&D. In fact, our estimates show the highest level of investment bene…ts and R&D expenditures for …rms in the highest …nancial strength category. On average, R&D investment is estimated to increase the long-run value of the …rm by 6.6 percent. More importantly, this gain in long-run value varies across industries and with …rm …nancial strength. Across industries, the average gain varies from 5.5 percent in the electronics industry to 8.0 percent in chemicals. Across …nancial strength categories, it varies from 11.6 percent for …rms in the highest category to 2.3 for …rms in the lowest category.
The next section incorporates the role of …nancial strength into the PRVF model of dynamic R&D choice. The third section summarizes the data sample, which is drawn from the Mannheim Innovation Panel. The fourth and …fth sections present the empirical model and discuss the results.
A Model of R&D Investment and Financial Strength
Following Griliches (1979) , a large empirical literature has estimated the impact of R&D on …rm productivity, output, or pro…ts using the knowledge production function framework. R&D creates a stock of knowledge or expertise within the …rm that enters into the …rm's production function as an additional input along with physical capital, labor, and materials. This framework was extended in several ways by Crépon, Duguet, and Mairesse (1998) . In their analysis they distinguished between the inputs and outputs of the innovation process, included measures of innovation outputs such as patents and the share of …rm sales devoted to new products in the empirical model, and utilized econometric methods that recognized the endogeneity of the 3 R&D choice. Their basic setup incorporated three equations characterizing the stages of the innovation process: (i) R&D equation describing the determinants of research inputs, (ii) innovation function linking research inputs and innovation outputs, and (iii) productivity equation linking innovations to productivity. This framework has been the basis for many empirical studies quantifying the impact of R&D on …rm performance. 2 One limitation of the existing CDM literature is that the equation describing the …rm's choice of R&D in stage 1 has not been speci…ed in a way that takes advantage of all the determinants of the …rm's R&D choice. The dynamic model developed by PRVF takes advantage of the CDM structure to specify the …rm's R&D investment decision as the solution to a dynamic optimization problem in which the …rm weighs the costs incurred against the expected long-run bene…t resulting from the investment. In their model, a …rm's investment in R&D alters its probability of realizing product or process innovations. The realized innovations shift the distribution of …rm's future productivity and pro…ts. Productivity is allowed to be persistent over time, so that improvements in one period can lead to a stream of higher future pro…ts. In this dynamic framework, the bene…t of R&D investment is its impact on the …rm's discounted sum of expected future pro…ts. This impact depends on how R&D a¤ects productivity and output in the subsequent period, which is the focus of the knowledge production function literature, but also on how the change in productivity impacts the discounted sum of future …rm pro…ts, including its e¤ect on the …rm's incentives to invest in R&D in the future.
A large empirical literature has quanti…ed the role of …nancial resources in the funding of R&D. Studies have found that the …rm's ability to generate funds internally is particularly important for …nancing innovation projects and they have corroborated a positive correlation between R&D investment and changes in cash ‡ow (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) , Leland and Pyle (1977), Hall (1992) , Bhagat and Welch (1995) , Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) , Bond, Harho¤ and Van Reenen (2005) , and Bougheas, Görg and Strobl (2003) ). 3 In addition, …rms may be reluctant to use other forms of …nancing including issuing equity (Carpenter and Peterson (2002) ) or using debt (Hall (2002) ). Even when …rms access credit markets, the fact that much of R&D investment is sunk and cannot be liquidated makes the investment a poor asset to use as security for the loans and increases the cost of external capital (Alderson and Betker (1996) ). The higher cost for external capital is likely to have a larger e¤ct on the R&D decision of …rms with low …nancial endowment. In the remainder of this section we introduce an indicator of the …rm's overall …nancial strength into the PRVF model to account for the heterogeneity in …nancing ability and investigate how this a¤ects the …rm's incentives to invest in R&D.
Productivity and the Firm' s Short-Run Pro…ts
We begin with a de…nition of productivity and its link to a …rm's short-run pro…ts. Following PRVF, we specify (i) a log linear short-run marginal cost function, which depends on variable input prices, capital stock, and a …rm-speci…c cost shock, and (ii) a CES demand function in which the log of …rm output is a function of an aggregate industry time e¤ect, the log of the …rm's output price, and a …rm-speci…c demand shifter. Assuming the …rm operates in a monopolistically competitive market, the …rm's revenue function is derived as:
The log of the …rm revenue in period t is r it ; the elasticity of demand is ; which is negative and assumed to be constant for all …rms in the industry, t is a time e¤ect that captures all market-level variables that are constant across …rms including the level of aggregate demand for the product and variable input prices, k it is the log of the …rm's capital stock, ! it is …rm productivity, and it is a transitory shock. The …rm is assumed to know its revenue productivity ! it which is unobserved to the researcher. Given the form of the …rm's optimal pricing rule, which implies a constant markup over marginal cost, there is a simple relationship between the …rm's short-run pro…ts and revenue: 
R&D Investment and Endogenous Productivity
In this article we treat R&D investment as a discrete variable rd it equal to one if the …rm spends money on innovation activities such as R&D and zero otherwise. The outcomes of the innovation process are discrete variables z it+1 and d it+1 equal to 1 if the …rm realizes a process or product innovation, respectively, in year t + 1 and 0 otherwise. The variable f it is a measure of the …rm's …nancial strength. We view a …rm conducting R&D as investing in a portfolio of innovation projects. Firms with a high degree of …nancial strength are able to invest in more projects than …rms with limited …nancial resources. How intensively …rms choose to invest depends on how their …nancial strength a¤ects the expected payo¤ from R&D. The next two components of the model specify this …nancial strength-expected payo¤ relationship.
PRVF model the innovation process by allowing the …rm's R&D participation to alter the joint probabilities of receiving product and process innovations. The probability the …rm realizes an innovation is likely to be increasing in the number of R&D projects or, more generally, the size of the …rm's R&D portfolio. Firms with higher …nancial strength have the ability to undertake more projects, hence we expect the probability of innovation to be increasing in the …rm's …nancial strength. We represent this innovation process by a cumulative joint distribution of innovation types conditional on the …rm's R&D choices and their …nancial strength
This component of the model corresponds to the second equation in the CDM framework. Our speci…cation of the innovation production process recognizes that …rms may direct their R&D activity toward improving their production processes and/or developing new or improved products and that the innovation outcomes are a¤ected by stochastic forces. Furthermore, it includes the …rm's …nancial strength as a proxy for the size of their R&D project portfolio.
The next component of the model is the innovation-productivity linkage, which corresponds to the third equation in the CDM model. PRVF model productivity as a persistent stochastic variable whose distribution is shifted by the …rm's past productivity and current realizations of product and process innovations. In addition, …rms with a large R&D portfolio may realize multiple innovations or innovations of higher quality. Converting the innovation into future sales and pro…ts may require investments in capital, worker training, hiring, or additional costs 6 that noninnovating …rms do not incur. These factors suggest that a …rm's access to …nancial resources plays a crucial role for the size of productivity gains resulting from innovation outcomes.
We model the evolution of the …rm's productivity with the cdf
More speci…cally:
The function g( ) is the conditional expectation of future productivity and " is an iid stochastic shock that is drawn from a N (0; 2 " ) distribution. We parameterize the productivity evolution process as a cubic function of lagged productivity and interaction terms between product innovations, process innovations, and the …rm's …nancial strength. Speci…cally, we classify each …rm into one of three …nancial strength categories based on its credit rating. In this speci…cation, the variable z it+1 f it represents the set of interactions between the innovation outcome z it+1 and the three dummy variables de…ning the …rm's …nancial strength, so 4 is a vector of three coe¢ cients. A similar de…nition is used for d it+1 f it and d it+1 z it+1 f it : In addition to allowing the …rm's …nancial strength to impact the evolution of the …rm's productivity, the coe¢ cients 1 ; 2 ; and 3 capture the intertemporal persistence that is an important feature of …rm-level data on productivity. Because productivity is persistent, the productivity shocks " in any period are incorporated into future productivity levels rather than having a purely transitory e¤ect.
The Firm' s Dynamic Decision to Invest in R&D
The …rm's decision to invest in R&D results from a comparison of the expected bene…ts of investing, which depend on expected future improvements in productivity and pro…ts, and the cost or investment expenditure needed to generate these improvements. We expect …rms to be heterogenous in their innovation costs because of di¤erences in the e¢ ciency of their R&D labs, the experience or education of their workers, economies of scale in the innovation process, and the nature of the speci…c innovation projects they are undertaking. We capture this heterogeneity by modeling R&D costs as depending on factors that lead to systematic di¤erences in R&D expenditure and a stochastic component. The …rst source of systematic di¤erence in the …rm's R&D expenditure occurs because a …rm that performs R&D continuously over time is likely to require a smaller expenditure to generate an innovation than a …rm that begins to invest in R&D because it can rely on past expertise or synergy e¤ects from previous projects. The second source is the size of the …rm's R&D portfolio. If investment is pro…table, …rms with better access to …nancial resources can …nance more projects at any time or …nance higher quality projects, and we would expect to see higher R&D investments for these …rms.
We assume that a …rm's R&D cost is a random draw from an exponential distribution, captures di¤erences in costs of maintaining ongoing R&D operations and start-up costs of beginning to invest in R&D for …rms in each of the three …nancial categories.
We assume that, at the start of period t; the …rm observes its current productivity level ! it , knows its short-run pro…t function, the process for innovation F; and the process for productivity evolution G: The …rm's state variables s it = (! it ; rd it 1 ) evolve endogenously as the …rm makes its decision to conduct R&D, rd it 2 f0; 1g: 5 Given its state vector and discount factor , the …rm's value function V (s it ), before it observes the maintenance or startup cost, can be written 5 Each …rm is characterized by three exogenous variables, its capital stock kit; which enters the pro…t function, its …nancial strength fit which enters the cost function for innovation and the innovation and productivity evolution processes, and its industry which enters all of the structural components. To simplify the notation, we suppress these exogenous characteristics and explain the dynamic decision to invest in R&D focusing on the endogenous variables in the model ! and rd. In the empirical model we treat the …rm's capital stock, …nancial strength, and industry as de…ning an exogenous …rm type and solve the …rm's value function for each …rm type. 8 as:
where the expected future value of the …rm is de…ned as an expectation over the future levels of productivity and innovation outcomes:
Equation (5) shows that the …rm chooses to invest in R&D if the discounted expected future pro…ts from investing, E t V (s it+1 j! it ; rd it = 1); net of the relevant maintenance or startup cost, are greater than the expected future pro…ts from not investing,
What di¤erentiates these two expected future pro…ts is the e¤ect of R&D on the …rm's future productivity. Using this speci…cation, we can de…ne the marginal bene…t of conducting R&D as:
The …rm chooses to invest in R&D if EV (! it ) C it (rd it 1 ): This condition is used in the empirical model to explain the …rm's observed R&D choice.
Overall, in contrast to CDM, this model endogenizes the …rm's choice to undertake R&D investments by explicitly characterizing the net expected future pro…ts from the two alternatives.
Following the approach developed in PRVF, we estimate the innovation function, productivity evolution process, and distributions of startup and maintenance costs faced by the …rm, and quantify EV (! it ), the expected long-run payo¤ to investing in R&D.
Data
The The estimation requires data on …rm revenue, variable costs, capital stock, innovation expenditures, product and process innovations, and …nancial strength. Firm revenue is total sales, total variable cost is the sum of expenditure on labor, materials, and energy, and the …rm's short-run pro…t is the di¤erence between revenue and total variable cost. The …rm's value is the discounted sum of the future short-run pro…ts. We restrict the sample to the …rms that report all the necessary variables and have at least two consecutive years of data. This gives a total of 1200 …rms and 3067 observations.
The …nancial strength variables are constructed from the …rm's credit rating produced by the company Creditreform. 6 The rating is based on the likelihood that the borrower will be able to service their debts fully and on time. It takes into account the credit opinion of experts, the …rm's business development strategy, past history of bill payments, growth, sales, capital, age, order history, industry, and legal form of organizaton among other things. We assign each …rm to one of three categories based on their credit rating. The Creditreform rating is a score between 100 and 600 with 100 being the best rating. We assign …rms to the high …nancial strength category if their rating is 100 to 190. Firms with credit ratings between 191-228 are classi…ed in the medium category and …rms with ratings higher than 229 are assigned to the low category. 7 In our sample, there is substantial persistence over time in a …rm's …nancial strength.
Between adjoining years, 95.5 percent of the …rms that start in the high-strength category, 91.4 that start in the middle category, and 87.3 percent that start in the low category, remain in the same category in the next year. In addition, 25.1 percent of the …rms remain in the high-strength category over the whole period we observe them, 31.6 percent in the medium category and 20.6 percent in the low category. The remaining 22.7 percent of the …rms switch at least once. In the dynamic model we will not attempt to model the transition process for 6 Creditreform is the largest German credit rating agency. This information has been used as a measure of …nancial constraints in previous studies by Czarnitzki (2006) and Czarnitzki and Hottenrott (2009) . A measure of credit constraints based on the repayment of trade credits has been used in Aghion, Askenazy, Berman, Cette and Eymard (2012). 7 In terms of Standard and Poor's rating system, the high category corresponds to ratings above BBB, the medium category to ratings above BB to BBB, and the low category to ratings BB and below. this variable, but rather assume that the …rm treats its …nancial strength category as …xed when making the R&D decision. to reduce production or delivery costs. For instance, the introduction of automation or ITnetworking technology in production or logistics are process innovations. The innovation does not have to be new to the market but only to the …rm. A …rm could report an innovation if it adopted a production technology from a competitor or expanded its product line even if the product was already o¤ered by other …rms. Table 1 summarizes the proportion of …rms in the sample that report positive innovation expenditures, successful product innovations, and successful process innovations for each industry and for the three discrete categories of …nancial strength. The …rst pattern to observe is that the rate of investment in innovation activities is always highest for the …rms in the high …nancial strength category and declines as we move to the medium and low …nancial strength categories. For example, in the chemical industry the proportion of …rms in the high strength category that invest is 0.805 and this declines to 0.737 and 0.695 with declines in …nancial strength. This monotonic reduction is present in every industry except the vehicle industry, where the medium category has the lowest investment rate. Averaging across the …ve industries, the investment rate is 0.873 for the high strength category, 0.759 for the medium, and 0.707 for the low category. This decline in the proportion of …rms that invest can re ‡ect either a decline in the expected bene…ts of innovation-related investments, an increase in the cost of innovation, or both. The structural model developed above is designed to distinguish these explanations.
A second pattern that is observed in Table 1 is that the rate of both new product and new process innovations declines as the …nancial position of the …rm becomes weaker. Again, the decline is monotonic across …nancial strength categories except for the vehicle industry. This decline could re ‡ect higher levels of R&D spending by the …nancially stronger …rms, so that they generate higher rates of innovation. A third pattern is that the investment rates in the top part of the table are always greater than the innovation rates for the corresponding category.
This re ‡ects the fact that some …rms invest in R&D but do not realize any innovations. Finally, the product innovation rate is greater than the process innovation rate. This can re ‡ect the fact that in this group of high-tech industries competition among …rms is more strongly related to improving product quality through product innovation rather than reducing cost through process innovations. 8 : 
Empirical Model
In this section we brie ‡y outline the key components and steps of the empirical model. Details of the estimation procedure are provided in PRVF. Estimation is divided into two steps. In the …rst step, the pro…t function, equations (1) and (2), and the process of productivity evolution, equation (3), are jointly estimated using the methodology developed by Doraszelski (2011)). At this stage we also estimate the innovation process F (d it+1; z it+1 j rd it ; f it ) nonparametrically using data on discrete innovation outcomes, discrete R&D, and the discrete …nancial strength variables.
In the second step, the parameters of the cost function for R&D are estimated using the …rm's discrete choice of R&D. The probability that a …rm chooses to invest in R&D is given by the probability that its innovation cost C it (rd it 1 ) is less than or equal to the expected payo¤:
Using parameter estimates from the …rst-stage we solve the value function, equation (5), on a grid of values for the state variables ! it and rd it 1 : The value function is solved and the payo¤ to R&D is constructed for each …rm type which is de…ned on a grid of values for the capital stock, industry, and …nancial strength category. Subsequently, we interpolate the payo¤ to R&D, EV (! it ); for each data point using a cubic spline. The estimates of EV (! it ) are used to predict the probability of conducting R&D and to construct the likelihood function for the discrete R&D choices in the data.
Empirical Results

Estimates of the Innovation and Productivity Processes
In this section we report the …ndings for the …rst step of the estimation. Table 2 reports estimates of the innovation probabilities conditional on prior year R&D and …nancial strength
There are four possible outcomes for the discrete innovation variables.
To simplify the results, we report the average across the …ve industries (the estimation recognizes the di¤erences across the industries). The top half of the table reports innovation probabilities for …rms that have not incurred innovation expenditures in the previous year and the bottom half reports the probabilities for …rms with positive innovation expenditure.
Among the …rms that did not invest in R&D, the probability of not getting either a new product or process innovation is large and rises from 0.713 to 0.801 as the …nancial strength of the …rm declines. Conversely, the probability of having both types of innovations declines from 0.164 to 0.104. For …rms in the high and medium …nancial group, product innovations occur more frequently while process innovations are more likely for …rms in the low …nancial group. Among the …rms that invested in R&D in the previous year, the probability of realizing neither type of innovation is signi…cantly lower, varying from 0.083 to 0.144 across groups, while the probability of both innovation types is substantially higher, ranging from 0.668 to 0.512.
Overall, the estimates in table 2 indicate a positive correlation between the …rm's …nancial strength and the probability of innovation. Firms with higher …nancial strength may have larger portfolios of R&D projects and thus be more likely to generate at least one innovation if they invest. Alternatively, if these …rms do not invest they may still be better able to exploit opportunities that arise through learning-by-doing or other pathways that do not involve explicit R&D investment. Table 3 reports two sets of parameter estimates for two di¤erent speci…cations of productivity evolution. In the …rst case, productivity evolution does not depend on the …rm's …nancial strength and the estimates of parameters 4 ; 5 ; and 6 measure the average impact of product and process innovations on productivity improvement across all …rms. The second case interacts dummy variables for the three …nancial strength categories with the innovation outcomes and allows the three innovation coe¢ cients to vary across the …nancial categories.
The …rst row of Table 3 reports the capital coe¢ cient which implies that increases in capital reduce the …rm's short-run marginal cost. The next three coe¢ cients summarize the persistence of …rm productivity over time and they indicate that productivity is highly persistent. These coe¢ cient estimates are hardly a¤ected when the …nancial strength categorical variables are added to the productivity process.
The coe¢ cients on the innovation variables exhibit a very interesting pattern. When the …nancial controls are not included the coe¢ cients indicate that a new product innovation raises productivity, on average, by 3.9 percent, while a process innovation raises it by 3.7 percent.
The coe¢ cients are statistically signi…cant at the .01 and .05 level, respectively. Firms that report both types of innovations have an average productivity increase of 6.8 percent, which is basically the sum of the two individual e¤ects, since the interaction coe¢ cient 6 is small and not statistically signi…cant. When the productivity impact of innovation is disaggregated by …nancial strength, we observe a larger e¤ect of innovation for …nancially strong …rms. For these …rms, a product innovation raises average productivity by 8.6 percent, a process innovation raises it by 9.0 percent. Firms with both innovations have, on average, a productivity gain of 11.5 percent. All three coe¢ cients are statistically signi…cant. In contrast, …rms in the medium …nancial strength category have more modest productivity gains from innovation. They average 3.9 percent for product innovations, 3.2 percent for process innovations, and 5.8 percent for …rms with both innovations, but only the product innovation e¤ect is statistically signi…cant. For the …rms in the lowest …nancial strength category, the productivity e¤ects are small: 0.8, 0.6, and 3.8 percent for product, process, and both innovations, respectively. None of the three coe¢ cients, however, are statistically signi…cant.
Overall, the productivity and thus, pro…t, impact of an innovation varies substantially across these groups of …rms and a¤ect their expected bene…ts from investing in R&D accordingly.
In particular, the small productivity impact of the innovations for …rms with low …nancial strength, gives them little incentive to invest in R&D. Products and processes developed with limited resources and fewer inputs might be of lower quality or limited scope and hence yield low productivity gains for the investing …rms. Furthermore, it takes …nancial resources to implement innovations. The path from developing a new product to actual sales and pro…ts requires investments in legal, marketing, design, and testing processes that require …nancial 16 resources. Firms in a strong …nancial position may also have invested in a larger number of research projects and thus have a larger number of innovations that they could potentially exploit. As a result, a strong …nancial position can help …rms to earn higher returns on their innovations. 
Estimates of the Cost of Innovation
The cost function we estimate in the second stage can be interpreted as the cost of purchasing the expected bene…t EV (! it ). The economic value of undertaking R&D depends on how it is translated into innovations, productivity, and pro…ts. The cost parameters estimated from …rms'discrete R&D decisions rationalize the expected bene…ts of R&D and the observed R&D investment rate. In particular, given two groups of …rms with the same investment rate, the group with lower expected bene…t from R&D must also have lower costs. With respect to …rms'…nancial strength, the expected bene…ts of investment are smaller for …rms in the lower …nancial strength categories, hence we will observe lower estimated costs for this group of …rms.
Alternatively, if two groups of …rms have the same expected bene…t, then the group with the higher investment rate must have lower costs.
The parameters characterizing the mean of the innovation cost function are reported in Table   4 . We allow the estimated cost parameters to di¤er across industries and …nancial categories.
The second column reports the cost parameters for …rms starting new R&D investment and the third column the costs for …rms maintaining their R&D program. In each case the startup cost is greater than the maintenance cost for the same industry or …nancial category, re ‡ecting the fact that the observed investment rate is lower for …rms that do not have previous R&D experience. With respect to the …nancial strength categories, the cost parameters decline as we move from the high to low strength category. The higher costs for the high strength category re ‡ects the higher expected bene…ts of R&D for …rms in this category. Finally, there are also industry di¤erences in the cost levels that re ‡ect industry variation in the expected bene…ts and investment rates. The magnitudes, however, are small compared to the di¤erences across …nancial categories. 
Expected Bene…ts, Costs, and Probability of Investment
We use the parameter estimates from the structural model to construct three summary measures of the R&D investment process for each …rm: …rst, the expected bene…t of R&D investment, equation (7) , which is a function of the …rm's productivity, capital stock, …nancial strength, and industry; second, the mean R&D expenditure, given the …rm chooses to invest in R&D,
EV (! it )); third, the probability the …rm invests in R&D, equation (8) .
The second and third measures depend on the …rm's prior R&D experience and the factors determining EV: Table 5 , column 2, reports the mean of each measure over all observations; similarly, columns 3, 4, and 5 report the mean of these measures over the observations in each …nancial category. In the top row we report the expected bene…t of investing in R&D. It averages 12.783 million euros over the total sample. This number is the average addition to …rm value resulting from R&D investment. Disaggregating this measure across the …nancial strength categories we see the average bene…t falls from 31.949 million euros to 5.463 and 1.347 million euros as …nancial strength declines. This decline re ‡ects the combined e¤ects of fewer innovations, as seen in Table 2 , and a smaller productivity impact of innovations for …rms with weak …nancial position, as seen in Table 3 . While not reported in the table, this fall in the expected bene…ts of investing in R&D is present in all …ve industries.
The second and third rows of Table 5 report the mean predicted R&D expenditure among those …rms that …nd it pro…table to invest in R&D. The expenditures di¤er between investing …rms paying a maintenance cost (rd t 1 = 1) and those paying a startup cost (rd t 1 = 0) for their investment. Firms that continue their R&D investments spend, on average, 1.557 million euros, while those that are starting R&D spend more, 4.213 million euros, on average. The predicted expenditure also depends on the …rm's …nancial strength, re ‡ecting the variation in the expected bene…ts of R&D across these categories. We predict for …nancially strong …rms, average expenditures of 4.503 and 10.587 million euros in the maintenance and startup cost categories, respectively. As the expected bene…ts of R&D decline with …nancial strength, the average expenditure does so as well. Firms in the lowest …nancial category have average predicted expenditures of 0.204 and 0.467 million euros.
The last two rows of Table 5 report the predicted probability of a …rm investing in R&D, which depends on both the expected bene…ts and cost distribution of the investment. Averaging over all …rms, the probability of investing is 0.829 for …rms with previous investment. This probability declines from 0.861 for …rms in the highest category to 0.855 and 0.746 for …rms in the medium and low …nancial categories, respectively. 10 For those …rms that are paying R&D startup costs, the probability of investing is much lower, 0.445 on average, and declines for all industries as …nancial strength declines. On average, this probability is 0.559, 0.432, and 0.330 for …rms in the three …nancial groups. Overall, Table 5 demonstrates that our measure of …rm …nancial strength captures a dimension of …rm heterogeneity that is related to the bene…ts and the average expenditure on R&D across …rms.
Long and Short-Run Returns to R&D
An advantage of the PRVF framework is that it provides measures of both the long-run and short-run bene…ts of R&D investment. The short-run gain captures changes in sales and pro…ts in the subsequent period, while the long-run gain captures the changes in …rm value due to the …rm being on a higher productivity path. The latter includes both a higher pro…t stream and di¤erent optimal future R&D choices. Both of these e¤ects are induced by the productivity gain resulting from R&D investment.
The long-run gain is de…ned as the proportional impact of R&D on …rm value. It is measured as the log di¤erence in the expected future value of the …rm, equation (6), conditional on its R&D choice while holding …xed the …rm's other characteristics:
ln EV = ln(EV (s it+1 j! it ; rd it = 1)) ln(EV (s it+1 j! it ; rd it = 0)):
The values are reported in the top panel of Table 6 , disaggregated by industry and …nancial category. The second column of Table 6 reports the mean value of EV (s it+1 j! it ; rd it = 0); denoted ____ EV ; which is the base to use for interpreting the proportional change in …rm value.
Focusing on all …rms in the sample, the mean of ln EV equals 0.066 with a standard deviation of 0.047. This means, across the whole sample, R&D investment increases the expected future value of the …rm by 6.6 percent, on average. When compared against the base of 127.44 million euros for the expected future value of the …rm in the absence of R&D investment, this equates to 8.38 million euros. The last three columns of the table show that this gain also varies across the …nancial strength categories, declining substantially as we move from the high to the low category. In the high category, the average return (standard deviation) is 0.116 (0.041) and this average return falls to 0.055 (0.025) and 0.023 (0.014) in the medium and low strength categories, respectively. The decline in average return re ‡ects all factors underlying the di¤erences between …rms in the three …nancial categories. These factors include the probability of receiving an innovation, the impact of innovation on productivity, and the di¤erences in …rms'productivity and capital stocks. The reduction in the standard deviation of the long-run return in …nancial strength states that …rms in the low strength group are more similar in their underlying productivity and size than …rms in the other two …nancial groups.
The remaining rows in the top panel of Table 6 provide the average long-run returns disaggregated by industry. The decline in the mean and standard deviation of the long-run return in …nancial strength is present in every industry. Since the base ___ EV varies across industries, the euro magnitude of the gains from R&D varies across industries as well. It is highest in the vehicle, chemical, and machinery industries. The empirical model also provides a measure of the short-run payo¤ to R&D, which we de…ne as the percentage gain in …rm revenue resulting from R&D investment. This is a discrete analog to the elasticity of output (usually measured as revenue) with respect to R&D expenditure that is frequently estimated in the CDM literature. In our framework, since pro…ts are proportional to revenue, equation (2), this percentage increase in revenue is equal to the percentage increase in pro…t. Using the estimation results on the e¤ect of R&D on the innovation probability ( Table   2 ) and innovation impact on productivity (Table 3) , we construct this measure as: Table 6 reports the mean estimate of this revenue gain for each industry and …nancial category. 11 The second column reports the average level of short-run pro…ts in each industry, denoted by _ .
Firms that invest in R&D have a revenue increase of between 9.3 (electronics) and 16.7
(vehicles) percent. These estimates are at the upper end of the range of output elasticity 1 1 There are no standard deviations in these cells because the estimate does not vary within a cell because it does not depend on …rm productivity or capital stock. In the model it only varies across …rms with di¤erences in industry and …nancial strength category.
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estimates with respect to R&D expenditure that are summarized in Hall, Mairesse, and Mohnen (2010). 12 Their reported measures generally come from studies measuring the percentage change in revenue for an additonal monetary unit of R&D spending, while our proportional gain in revenue comes from a zero-one R&D choice. If the marginal revenue gain declines with additional spending, then our measure, the discrete impact of R&D investment, is likely to be larger.
The last three columns of Table 6 report the short-run revenue gain across …rms with di¤erent degrees of …nancial strength. The estimates vary substantially in this dimension. For …rms in the highest category, the revenue di¤erence averages 23.4 percent and varies from 12.9 to 33.4 percent across industries. These numbers translate into absolute gains of 6.89, 6.68, and 15.63 million euros, respectively. In each industry, the proportional gain in revenue declines as we move to the medium and low categories. For …rms in the low strength category, the gain from R&D averages 5.7 percent and varies in a narrower band between 4.3 to 6.8 percent across the industries.
Conclusion
In a recent paper, Peters, Roberts, Vuong, and Fryges (2013) develop a dynamic, structural model of R&D choice. The …rm's decision to invest in R&D is modeled as the solution to a dynamic optimization problem in which the …rm weighs the costs of investment against the expected long-run bene…t from conducting R&D. In their model, the bene…ts of the investment depend on the R&D-innovation-productivity linkage that was introduced by Crépon, Duguet, and Mairesse (1998) . In this article, we use the PRVF framework to study the role of a …rm's …nancial strength on its decision to invest in R&D. Using data for a sample of German manufacturing …rms in …ve high technology industries, we construct a measure of …nancial strength based on the …rm's credit rating and allow this to a¤ect the R&D-innovation-productivity process at several points. The …rm's …nancial strength can a¤ect its R&D investment decision by a¤ecting their ability to commercialize and exploit innovations they generate.
Our empirical …ndings indicate that the expected long-run payo¤ from investing in R&D increases with the …rm's …nancial strength. This occurs because …rms in a strong …nancial position have a higher probability of realizing product and process innovations. In addition to being able to devote more resources to innovation, …rms in a strong …nancial position may also be able to develop a portfolio of complementary projects that enhances their innovation success.
The empirical results further show that the impact of innovations on productivity and pro…ts is larger for …rms in a strong …nancial position. This higher economic return could re ‡ect higher quality innovations, an ability to better develop and market the innovations, and the return on a larger number of R&D projects that they are able to sustain. Finally, the results show that these …rms have higher expenditures on R&D investment but, overall, the higher expected net payo¤ gives …rms with greater …nancial strength a larger incentive to invest in R&D.
The PRVF model provides a useful measure of the expected long-run bene…t of R&D, de…ned as the increment to long-run …rm value resulting from the R&D investment. In the …ve German industries we study in this article, this average bene…t varies from 5.5 percent in the electronics industry to 8.0 percent in chemicals. Comparing across …nancial strength categories, the average increase in …rm value is 11.6 percent for …rms in the highest category, 5.5 in the medium, and 2.3 in the lowest category.
While this article documents that the underlying factors that contribute to the …rm's R&D investment choice are positively correlated with the …nancial strength of the …rm as indicated by its credit rating, the distinct roles of internal cash ‡ow, retained past earnings, and external funding as sources of investment funds cannot be identi…ed with the data we use. In addition, the …rm's credit rating may be a proxy for more than just the …nancial resources available to the …rm. It re ‡ects other factors including the overall quality of the …rm's product line, its longevity, or quality of its management that are not directly related to its ability to fund R&D investment. The results indicate that there is an important source of …rm heterogeneity explaining di¤erences in …rm R&D choice beyond its capital stock, productivity, industry, and R&D history. For this reason, we prefer to view our …ndings on the role of …nancial strength as likely re ‡ecting a broader pattern of variation due to di¤erences in …rm quality, rather than 24 more speci…c conclusions about the role of …nancial constraints in the …rm's R&D investment decision.
